A Global Society?

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1 Introduction

One of the most significant legacies of the Enlightenment for modern social and political thought has been the belief that the universal community of humankind is in all respects "... the end or object of the highest moral endeavour" (Bull, 1977, p. 27). Underlying this vision is an assumption that at root the needs and interests of all human beings are universally similar. Such a vision has shaped the emancipatory aspirations of both liberalism and Marxism, which have been committed to the eradication of those structures – the state and capitalism respectively – deemed to suppress the realization of a cosmopolitan world order based on liberty, justice, and equality for all of humanity. As the end of the twentieth century approaches, the growing recognition, reinforced by satellite images from space, that planet earth is a single "place" has reawakened intellectual interest in Enlightenment notions of a universal community of humankind. Moreover, "surface" events, such as the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism, the global diffusion of democratic institutions and practices, together with the intensification of patterns of world-wide economic, financial, technological, and ecological interdependence, have signalled to many observers the final clearing away of the old world order, with all its menacing features, and the inauguration of a new world order which contains the promise of an evolving world society, a single global "community of fate." Certainly, there can be little doubt that the world is being remade around us, that radical changes are underway which may be transforming the fundamental parameters of modern human, social, and political existence. Rosenau proclaims that the world has entered the era of post-international politics, a "historical breakpoint" in which "... present premises and understanding of history's dynamics must be treated as conceptual jails" (Rosenau, 1990, p. 5).

The notion of post-international politics suggests that, at the century's end, globalization – simply the intensification of global interconnectedness – is *transforming* the existing world order most conspicuously through its direct challenge to the primacy of the nation-state in its present form. One of the principal issues examined in this chapter is therefore the question of whether humanity is witnessing the unfolding of a new historical epoch (one which is distinguished by a progressive globalization of human relations and the emergence of the first truly "global historical civilization"), or alternatively whether the present "phase" of globalization simply conceals a renewed strengthening of the existing structures of western modernity – capitalism, industrialism, and the nation-state system. Within this discursive framework, the implications of the globalization of social life, both for the viability of the modern nation-state (in its present form) and for the "sociological imagination," will be systematically and critically explored.

1.1 Themes and structure

Most traditional sociology textbooks tend to open with the claim that the sociological enterprise is primarily concerned with the study of "modern society," understood as a cohesive, bounded totality, an integrated social system. Society, in effect, therefore becomes indistinguishable from the nation-state. This conflation of the two concepts is hardly surprising since, as a discipline, "modern" sociology reflects its nineteenth-century origins, during an age of virulent nationalism and nation-state formation. Despite the emphasis the founding "fathers" gave to comparative sociology, much contemporary theorizing still remains focused on the "national society." As Turner notes, although it sought to be a universal science of human affairs, ". . . in practice sociology has been developed to explain and understand local or national destinies" (Turner, 1990, p. 343). However, in a "shrinking" world, where transnational relations, networks, activities, and interconnections of all kinds transcend national boundaries, it is increasingly difficult to "understand local or national destinies," without reference to global forces. The dynamics of the global financial system; the tremendous expansion of transnational corporate activity; the existence of global communications and media networks; the global production and dissemination of knowledge, combined with (among other factors) the escalating significance of transnational religious and ethnic ties; the enormous flows of peoples across national boundaries; and the emerging authority of institutions and communities above the nation-state: all these factors provide a powerful case for reassessing the traditional conception of society (and by association the nation-state) as a bounded, ordered, and unified social space – a coherent totality. If, as many would argue, globalization is reconstituting the world as "one place," then a re-focusing of the sociological project – away from "society" and the "nation-state" towards the emerging "world society" – would seem a logical prerequisite for making sense of the contemporary human condition. Bauman puts the point clearly: "With the sovereignty of nation-states vividly displaying its limitations . . . the traditional model of society loses its credence as a reliable frame of reference . . ." (Bauman, 1992, p. 57).

Globalization strikes at many of the orthodoxies of social science, and more particularly the sociological project. At one level, the prospect of a "world society" resurrects the highly contentious issue, first posed and answered by the Enlightenment *philosophes*, as to the validity of universalist accounts of social phenomena. If globalization is characterized by universal socio-economic processes, does this not suggest the need for universal accounts of social affairs, and by definition the existence of some universal truths? Globalization also brings into question foundational concepts – "society" and the "nation-state" – which still retain a privileged position in the discourse of modern sociology and the social sciences more widely. Finally, globalization poses an interesting set of normative questions concerning the future of the nation-state and the nature of the modern political

community. For, in an age in which global interconnectedness appears to be intensifying, the most pressing issue must be whether the nation-state and the national political community will remain viable and sustainable forms of political and social organization. In effect, globalization raises the prospect of the "end of the nation-state" as the primary container of modernity. It is somewhat ironic that, as the century draws to a close, the pace of "progress" is being indicted for dissolving one of the quintessential institutions of modernity: the nation-state. It seems equally ironic that, at the very moment sociology encounters the possibility of a "world society," it is gripped by the discourse of post-modernity which denies the plausibility of any universal truths or knowledge through which such an emerging "global social formation" might be comprehended (Archer, 1991).

While the conclusion of the chapter will confront these apparent ironies, the main narrative will be devoted to an exegesis of the contemporary debates about globalization, with specific emphasis on its consequences for the nation-state and the sociological imagination. The discussion will embrace:

1 an examination of the discourse of globalization;
2 a review of the dimensions of globalization;
3 the emerging debate on globalization and the formation of a global society;
4 the implications of a global society for the continued viability of the nation-state and the national political community; and
5 an assessment of why globalization invites the return of a more universal sociology, and the corresponding demise of "society" as the basic unit of sociological analysis.

2 Modernity and Globalization

In comparison with previous historical epochs, the modern era has supported a progressive globalization of human affairs. The primary institutions of western modernity – industrialism, capitalism, and the nation-state – have acquired, throughout the twentieth century, a truly global reach. But this has not been achieved without enormous human cost, since western globalization has been fuelled by a tremendous "arrogance and violence" (Modelski, 1972, p. 49). While early phases of globalization brought about the physical unification of the world, more recent phases have remade the world into a single global system in which previously distinct historical societies or civilizations have been thrust together. This should not be taken to imply that globalization involves global cultural homogenization or global political integration. Rather, it defines a far more complex condition, one in which patterns of human interaction, interconnectedness, and awareness are reconstituting the world as a single social space.

2.1 "Globe talk": the discourse of globalization

During the 1980s, the concept of globalization began to permeate a diverse body of literatures within the social sciences. This intellectual fascination with globalization and its consequences was stimulated in part by a concern to understand the nature of the socio-economic changes which appeared to be enveloping all advanced capitalist societies. In part the fascination was also associated with a perception that the fates of individual national communities were increasingly bound together, a perception underlined by the global economic recession of the early 1980s, the renewed threat of nuclear armageddon following the intensification of Soviet–American rivalry, and the impending eco-crisis. These, and other events, became significant reference points in a growing literature which sought to analyze the ways in which daily existence within most countries was becoming increasingly enmeshed in global processes and structures. This expanded awareness of global interconnectedness was reinforced by the electronic media, which were capable of bringing to their audience's immediate attention distant events, so creating a sense of a globally shared community. Today, "globalization" has become a widely used term within media, business, financial, and intellectual circles, reflecting a fairly widespread perception that modern communications technology has shrunk the globe. However, popular use of the term and its many definitions within the social sciences have imbued the concept with multiple meanings. How then should we understand the term?

Globalization refers to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation-states (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. Nowadays, goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, communications, crime, culture, pollutants, drugs, fashions, and beliefs all readily flow across territorial boundaries. Transnational networks, social movements, and relationships are extensive in virtually all areas of human activity from the academic to the sexual. Moreover, the existence of global systems of trade, finance, and production binds together in very complicated ways the prosperity and fate of households, communities, and nations across the globe. Territorial boundaries are therefore arguably increasingly insignificant insofar as social activity and relations no longer stop – if they ever did – at the water's edge. It is thus largely irrelevant to continue to make distinctions between the internal and the external, the foreign and the domestic spheres of socio-economic activity, when globalization has resulted in a "stretching" of social relations across national territorial boundaries (Giddens, 1990, p. 14). But the concept of globalization articulates something much more profound about modern social existence than the simple fact of growing interconnectedness between nation-states.

Within the literature, two authors – Giddens and Harvey – have made a significant contribution to the theorization of globalization. Giddens considers globalization to be one of the most visible consequences of modernity. This is because globalization involves a profound reordering of time and space in social life – what Giddens refers to as "time–space distanciation" (1990, p. 14). He stresses how the development of global networks of communication and complex global systems of production and exchange diminishes the grip of local circumstances over people's lives. Thus, the jobs of Scottish miners may be more dependent on the pricing decisions of Australian and South African coal companies in the global market than on the immediate decisions of local management. In Giddens's view, this "disembedding" of social relations – lifting them out "from local contexts of interaction" and recombining them across time and space – is primarily associated with the forces of modernity. However, globalization expands the scope of such disembedding processes, with the consequence that ". . . larger and larger numbers of people live in circumstances in which disembedded institutions, linking local practices with globalized social relations, organize major aspects of day-to-day life" (Giddens, 1990, p. 79). This certainly does not mean that "place" or "locale" are no longer significant in structuring social life, but rather that ". . . the truth of experience no longer coincides with the place in which it takes place" (Jameson, quoted in Harvey, 1989, p. 261). The point is that, in today's world, social relations and interaction are not dependent on simultaneous physical "presence" within a specific location, since the structures and institutions of modern societies, facilitated by instantaneous communication, foster intense ". . . relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction" (Giddens, 1990, p. 18). Globalization articulates, in a most dramatic manner, this conflation of "presence" and "absence" through its systemic interlocking of the "local" and the "global." For Giddens, the concept of globalization therefore embraces much more than a notion of simple interconnectedness: ". . . the concept of globalization is best understood as expressing fundamental aspects of time–space distanciation. Globalization concerns the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations 'at a distance' with local contextualities" (Giddens, 1991, p. 21).

In his exploration of the "post-modern condition," Harvey, too, conceives of globalization as an expression of our changing experience of time and space – what he labels "time–space compression" (Harvey, 1989, p. 240). By using this term, he highlights dramatically the sense in which, under the pressures of technological and economic change, space and time have been continually collapsed such that ". . . today we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds" (Harvey, 1989, p. 240). What is distinctive about Harvey's analysis of globalization is the emphasis placed on the "speeding up" or intensity of time–space compression.

For Harvey, today's "global village" is not the product of some

smooth linear or exponential process of time–space compression, but rather results from a more discontinuous historical process, a process punctuated by discrete phases or bursts of intense time–space compression. These phases, he argues, are associated with the periodic crises and restructuring of capitalism, which involve a "speeding up" of economic and social processes. We are all aware from our own experiences of the way in which, particularly in the current era, the quickening pace of change seems to have become a "normal" feature of social life. Virtually as they are launched, new fashions, new products, even major historical events, seem to become redundant "history." One of the consequences of this speeding up of socio-economic change is an intensification of time–space compression, and with this comes an acceleration in the pace of globalization.

According to Harvey, ". . . we have been experiencing, these last two decades, an intense phase of time–space compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life" (Harvey, 1989, p. 284). This phase coincided with a deep crisis of capitalist accumulation, which was at its most intense in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has been associated with a dramatic intensification of globalization. This intensification of globalization has been most pronounced in the spheres of manufacturing production and finance. In both these sectors, the speeding up of technological and organizational change has fostered an increased global mobility of capital, such that a new international division of labor appears to be emerging. Central to this has been the creation of the first truly global financial system, with twenty-four-hour-a-day trading: "The formation of a global stock market, of global commodity (even debt) futures markets, of currency and interest rate swaps, together with an accelerated geographical mobility of funds, meant, for the first time, the formation of a single world market for money and credit supply" (Harvey, 1989, p. 161). Globalization, in Harvey's analysis, is therefore intimately associated with the speeding up or intensification of time–space compression in social life.

These distinctive "meanings" attached to the concept of globalization share much in common, even though the theoretical approaches of Giddens and Harvey are very different. How can these "meanings" be distilled into a general conceptualization of the term? An acceptable solution is to conceive of globalization as having two interrelated dimensions: scope (or "stretching") and intensity (or "deepening"). On the one hand, the concept of globalization defines a universal process or set of processes which generate a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system: the concept therefore has a spatial connotation. Social, political, and economic activities are becoming "stretched" across the globe, such that events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have immediate significance for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the global system. On the other hand, globalization also implies an intensification in the levels of interaction, interconnectedness, or interdependence between the states

and societies which constitute the modern world commur
Accordingly, alongside this "stretching" goes a "deepenin
that, even though ". . . everyone has a local life, phenome
the most part are truly global" (Giddens, 1991, p. 187). Th
globalization involves a growing interpenetration of the gl
condition with the particularities of place and individuali
1990, 1991).

3 Mapping the Dimensions of Globalization

Clarifying the meaning of globalization invites further con
how it has been theorized within the literature. There is c
debate concerning both the main driving force(s) behind g
and how exactly it is reconstituting the world into a singl
Section 3 will outline the theoretical debates with respect
underlying causal logic(s) and dynamics of globalization.
introduce the main protagonists in these debates and thei
theoretical positions on these issues.

3.1 Logics

A review of the literature on globalization highlights one f
axis of theoretical disagreement. As David Held noted in
accounts of modernity divide into two camps: those whicl
single causal logic, and those which emphasize a complex
logic. Similarly, in discussions of globalization, it is possil
distinguish between those accounts which give primacy tc
causal dynamic, such as technology or the economy, and
rely on a multi-causal logic. Obviously, this is a somewha
typology of theoretical approaches, and no single account
within either category. Nevertheless, despite the oversimp
typology has considerable utility in structuring this brief
the primary theorizations of globalization.

Turning initially to those accounts which stress the pri
particular causal logic, the three key authors are Wallerste
and Gilpin. Wallerstein has introduced the concept of the
into the social sciences and has stressed the centrality of
the process of globalization (both past and present). Rosen
Gilpin, in comparison, are located within the discipline of
relations and have exploited some of its orthodoxies in ac
globalization. Thus, Rosenau associates globalization with
"progress," while Gilpin considers it to be an expression c
military factors (power politics). Accordingly, each of thes
authors locates the causal logic of globalization in a specif
institutional domain: the economic, the technological, and
respectively.

In his pioneering studies of the emergence of "one worl

Wallerstein focuses primarily on the dynamics of historical capitalism, "... that concrete, time-bounded, space-bounded integrated locale of productive activities within which the endless accumulation of capital has been the economic objective or 'law' that has governed or prevailed" (Wallerstein, 1983, p. 18). For Wallerstein, the logic of historical capitalism is necessarily global in reach. From its origins in sixteenth-century Europe, capitalism has acquired a truly global reach inasmuch as, nowadays, "... the entire globe is operating within the framework of this singular social division of labour we are calling the capitalist world-economy" (Wallerstein, 1984, p. 18). Wallerstein considers this capitalist world-economy to be historically unique, in that, while it has gradually created a universal economic space, humanity remains fragmented into discrete nation-states, each with its own center of sovereign political rule. Moreover, the world-economy is conceived of as having a distinctive, unequal structural arrangement with core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral areas – each of which has a specific functional role in sustaining the overall integrity of the system. The material fate of states, communities, and households flows from their location in this structure; a structure which maintains enormous inequalities in power and wealth. In addition, the periodic crises of capitalism mean that the world-economy is subject to discrete phases of global economic restructuring which reinforce these inequalities of power and wealth. But this restructuring also heightens the internal contradictions of the world-economy. Wallerstein argues that the universalization and deepening of capitalism provoke resistance on a global scale in the form of anti-systemic movements (e.g. environmental, socialist, and nationalist movements). The institutionalization of the world capitalist economy therefore embraces both processes of global integration and fragmentation, and this produces instabilities and contradictions which Wallerstein believes will eventually lead to its collapse (Wallerstein, 1991). Embedded in this analysis is an unambiguous thesis: namely, that the driving force of globalization is to be located in the logic of the capitalist world-economy.

If Wallerstein gives primacy to capitalism as a globalizing imperative, Rosenau privileges technology and its transformative capacities. An international relations scholar, Rosenau has written extensively on the growth and significance of global "interdependence" (Rosenau, 1980, 1989, 1990). In his attempt to make sense of the intensification of global interconnectedness he attaches enormous significance to technology:

> It is technology ... that has so greatly diminished geographic and social distances through the jet-powered airliner, the computer, the orbiting satellite, and the many other innovations that now move people, ideas and goods more rapidly and surely across space and time than ever before. It is technology that has profoundly altered the scale on which human affairs take place ... It is technology, in short, that has fostered the interdependence of local, national and international communities that is far greater than any previously experienced.
> (Rosenau, 1990, p. 17)

Rosenau considers that an underlying shift from an industrial to a post-industrial order is transforming the global human condition. Accordingly, he argues that humankind has escaped the age of international politics – an age in which nation-states dominated the global scene – and is today witnessing the arrival of the era of "post-international politics" – an era in which nation-states have to share the global stage with international organizations, transnational corporations, and transnational movements. The state is therefore no longer the primary unit of global affairs. Although a novel account of globalization, Rosenau's thesis derives from a fairly extensive literature, with its origins in nineteenth-century sociology, which views industrialism (and now "post-industrialism") as a powerful agent of global socio-economic and political transformation (Parkinson, 1977, ch. 6). (This particular strand of theorizing will be explored further in section 4.3.)

In comparison with Rosenau, Gilpin's account of globalization issues very much from within the orthodox approach to the study of international relations. Highly skeptical of any claim that globalization is transforming the world in which we live, Gilpin nonetheless acknowledges that nation-states are now profoundly interconnected in many different ways (Gilpin, 1987a). But, unlike Rosenau and Wallerstein, he argues that the process of globalization is a product of political factors, in particular the existence of a "permissive" global order – a political order which generates the stability and security necessary to sustain and foster expanding linkages between nation-states. In a global states system, where sovereign nations recognize no authority above their own, the creation of such a permissive political order can only arise from the exercise of power. For Gilpin, globalization is therefore a historically contingent process; contingent in the sense that it relies on the hegemonic (i.e. dominant, most powerful) state(s) in the international system to impose a form of world order which fosters interaction, openness, cooperation, and interdependence (Gilpin, 1981, 1987a). Thus, he asserts:

> My position is that a hegemon is necessary to the existence of a liberal international economy ... historical experience suggests, that in the absence of a dominant liberal power, international economic cooperation has been extremely difficult to attain or sustain and conflict has been the norm ... The expansion and success of the market in integrating modern [global] economic life could not have occurred without the favourable environment provided by the liberal hegemonic power.
> (Gilpin, 1987a, pp. 88 and 85)

Historically, globalization has been associated, particularly in the era of the European empires, largely with the expansionist drives of hegemonic powers. But, for Gilpin, the age of empires has now passed. Accordingly, more recent phases of globalization can be attributed

instead to the permissive nature of the liberal world order, nurtured by the might of the hegemonic liberal state(s). Thus, in the age of Pax Britannica, high levels of international interdependence existed, while during the era of Pax Americana globalizing processes intensified, underwritten by a stable security order and US military might (Gilpin, 1986). The key point, for Gilpin and those who share his analysis, is that in the modern era global interconnectedness (and its intensification) is conditional on the existence of a stable and secure world order guaranteed by the power and military supremacy of a hegemonic (liberal) state. Globalization is shaped primarily by a political logic: the rise and decline of hegemonic powers in the inter-state system. So, in recent history, the most intense periods of globalization have been associated with the apogee of the hegemonic state's power in the global system (e.g. the US in the post-war era), while the decline of the hegemon (for instance, the United States today) can bring increased instability and an attenuation of global "interdependence" (Gilpin, 1987b).

Wallerstein, Rosenau, and Gilpin provide quite different accounts of globalization, although they share in common the fact that each privileges a single causal logic. However, a rather different "school" of theorizing exists within the literature, giving weight to a multi-causal logic in accounting for globalization. Giddens and Robertson are among the central figures within this particular "school."

As part of his systematic exploration of the contours of modernity, Giddens approaches the phenomenon of globalization by distinguishing between what he understands to be its constituent dimensions (Giddens, 1990, p. 70). Instead of a single causal logic, Giddens points to four discrete, but nonetheless intersecting, dimensions of globalization: capitalism; the inter-state system; militarism; and industrialism. Each of these dimensions embodies a distinctive globalizing imperative, nurtured by quite different institutional forces and constituencies. Thus, the logic and contradictions of the capitalist world-economy influence the pace and pattern of economic globalization while, within the inter-state system, it is the "universalism of the nation-state" form which is responsible for the creation of a single world (Giddens, 1987, p. 283). Similarly, ". . . the globalising of military power . . ." (Giddens, 1990, p. 75) is tied to the logic of militarism, while the changing global division of labor is conditioned by the logic of industrialism. By theorizing these institutional dimensions of globalization, Giddens articulates an account of the global condition in which the ". . . connections between the emergence and spread of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state system" are emphasized (Giddens, 1987, p. 288). Globalization is therefore understood as something ". . . more than a diffusion of Western institutions across the world, in which other cultures are crushed," but rather embraces a complex, discontinuous, and contingent process, which is driven by a number of distinct but intersecting logics; it is ". . . a process of uneven development that fragments as it coordinates" (Giddens, 1990, p. 175). Within Giddens's analytical framework, globalization and ". . . the world system should

be seen as influenced by several sets of primary processes associated with the nation-state system, coordinated through global networks of information exchange, the world capitalist economy and the world military order" (Giddens, 1987, p. 288).

While Robertson disagrees with important aspects of Giddens's analysis, he too is highly critical of the fact that ". . . in the present climate of 'globality' there is a strong temptation for some to insist that the single world of our day can be accounted for in terms of one particular process or factor . . ." (Robertson, 1990, p. 22). Stressing that ". . . in the contemporary period a major task for sociological theory is to account for the trajectories of globalization in a multidimensional fashion" (Robertson and Lechner, 1985, p. 113), Robertson advocates a theoretical approach which goes ". . . beyond simple models of 'world polity' or a 'world economy' by [pointing] to the independent dynamics of global culture . . . to cultural aspects of globalization" (Robertson and Lechner, 1985, p. 103). This requires a theory of globalization which involves ". . . the analytical separation of the factors which have facilitated the shift towards a single world – e.g. the spread of capitalism, western imperialism and the development of a global media system – from the general and global agency-structure (and/or culture) theme" (Robertson, 1990, p. 22). Although he does not fully develop a systematic account of the interrelationships between the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of globalization, it is abundantly evident from Robertson's work that each is understood to have a distinctive logic (Robertson, 1990; 1991a; 1991b). However, his approach is fundamentally different from that of Giddens, since he is less concerned with mapping the intersections between these dimensions, or their independent logics, than in understanding how they foster the duality of universalization and particularization – themes which will be explored in chapter 18 in the context of culture and the formation of identity in "one world" (Robertson, 1991a).

This brief exegesis of the two most important "schools" of theorizing about globalization raises many difficult questions. Most obviously, it elicits a desire to establish the "truth" or at least the validity of these accounts: are they competing or contradictory views, can they be conflated, are there criteria by which we can judge their worth as "explanations"? As will become apparent in chapter 19, such questions are driven by a particular view of knowledge which has come under increasing attack from post-modernist challenges to the prevailing orthodoxies within the social sciences. Rather than engage with those issues here, it is sufficient to acknowledge that a healthy debate exists between two distinctive "traditions" of theorizing about globalization – between those theorists such as Wallerstein, Rosenau, and Gilpin who privilege one causal "logic" in their accounts of globalization, and those theorists such as Giddens and Robertson who emphasize intersecting causal "logics." However, my own sympathies lie with the work of Giddens and others who stress the multi-causal logic shaping the nature of contemporary globalization (McGrew, 1992). This attachment to a multi-causal account of globalization reflects the intellectual position adopted in many of the chapters of this volume. For the

present, our gaze must turn away from the logics of globalization to its dynamics.

3.2 Dynamics

It should be apparent by this stage that the discourse of globalization – "global babble" or "globe talk" – is characterized by considerable complexity. This may well reflect the "real" nature of globalization, or it may simply issue from the nature of the discourse itself. In exploring the dynamics of globalization, a more intense sense of complexity, and even ambiguity, surfaces. This arises because, within the existing literature, globalization is understood as a process which is essentially *dialectical* in nature and *unevenly* experienced across time and space.

Sophisticated accounts of globalization are not teleological in the sense that they assume the existence of an inexorable historical process leading to a universal human community. Rather, globalization is generally understood to be a *contingent* and *dialectical* process; dialectical in the simple sense of embracing contradictory dynamics. As Giddens explicitly acknowledges, globalization "... is a dialectical process because ..." it does not bring about "... a generalized set of changes acting in a uniform direction, but consists in mutually opposed tendencies" (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). But what is the substantive form which these "opposed tendencies" take? Several "binary oppositions" or dualities are commonly identified within the discourse of globalization:

Universalization versus particularization In the same way that globalization universalizes aspects of modern social life (e.g. the nation-state, assembly line production, consumer fashions, etc.), it simultaneously encourages particularization by relativizing both "locale" and "place" so that an intensification (or manufacturing) of uniqueness (or difference) is thereby fostered (e.g. the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic identities) (Robertson, 1990; Wallerstein, 1991; Harvey, 1989).

Homogenization versus differentiation Inasmuch as globalization brings about an essential "sameness" to the surface appearance and institutions of modern social life across the globe (e.g. city life, religion, McDonalds, the existence of human rights, bureaucratization, etc.), it also involves the assimilation and re-articulation of the global in relation to local circumstances (e.g. human rights are interpreted in very different ways across the globe; the practice of Islam is quite different in different countries, etc.) (Hannerz, 1991).

Integration versus fragmentation While globalization creates new forms of global, regional, and transnational communities or organizations which unite people across territorial boundaries (e.g. the transnational corporation, international trade unions, transnational class formations), equally, it also divides and fragments communities, both within and across traditional nation-state boundaries. For

example, labor becomes increasingly divided along local, national, and sectoral lines; and ethnic and racial divisions become more acute as the "Others" become more proximate (Bull, 1977; Bozeman, 1984).

Centralization versus decentralization Although globalization facilitates an increasing concentration of power, knowledge, information, wealth, and decision-making authority (e.g. the European Community, transnational companies), it also generates a powerful decentralizing dynamic as nations, communities, and individuals attempt to take greater control over the forces which influence their "fate" (e.g. the activities of new social movements, such as the peace, women's, or environmental movements) (Rosenau, 1990; Wallerstein, 1991).

Juxtaposition versus syncretization By compressing time and space, globalization forces the juxtaposition of different civilizations, ways of life, and social practices. This both reinforces social and cultural prejudices and boundaries while simultaneously creating "shared" cultural and social spaces in which there is an evolving "hybridization" of ideas, values, knowledge, and institutions (e.g. the mixing of cuisines, New Age lifestyles, architecture, advertising images, etc.) (Perlmutter, 1991; Jameson, 1991).

These contradictory tendencies are inscribed in the very dynamics of globalization; a process which is by definition dialectical. For the participants in "globe talk," the contradictory nature of globalization serves to remind us of its essential contingency and complexity. This is further reinforced by the *unevenness* with which globalization has been experienced across time and space.

In *The Principles of World Politics*, Modelski (1972) provides what must be among the first – if not the first – serious use and systematic discussion of the concept of globalization within the social sciences. Central to his analysis is the notion of globalization as a historical process; a process which has distinctive (if not discrete) phases during which the pace of globalization appears to "speed up" or be attenuated. With respect to the present historical epoch, many writers, including Rosenau, Harvey, and Jameson, point to an intensification of globalization which marks a profound break with the past. Whether the current epoch is defined as "post-international politics" (Rosenau, 1990, p. 6), an emerging "postmodern global space" (Jameson, 1991, p. 363), or a new world capitalist order (Harvey, 1989, ch. 9), what is common to these authors is a sense of globalization as a discontinuous historical process.

This unevenness across time is also reflected in the differential reach of globalization. Not only is it considered to "speed up" at various historical conjunctures, but similarly its consequences are not uniformly experienced across the globe. Some regions of the globe are more deeply implicated in global processes than others, and some are more deeply integrated into the global order than others. Within nation-states, some communities (e.g. financial ones) are tightly enmeshed in global networks, while others (e.g. the urban homeless) are totally

excluded (although not entirely unaffected) by them. And, even within the same street, some households are more deeply embedded in global processes than others. This unevenness characterizes a highly asymmetrical structure of power relations. For globalization tends on the whole to reinforce (if not to increase) inequalities of power and wealth, both between nation-states and across them, so reproducing global hierarchies of privilege, control and exclusion (Walker, 1988). Yet, as noted above, there are contradictory forces at work here, since globalization generates new centers of resistance. As Modelski comments, "... globalization has ... been profoundly divisive and the effects of this divisiveness are yet to be fully experienced" (Modelski, 1972, p. 55).

4 A Global Society?

Both liberalism and Marxism have their roots in an "enlightened" universalism which looked forward to the eventual emergence of a cosmopolitan world society; a global community in which transnational social bonds and universally held notions of peace, justice, equality, and freedom would define the conditions of human existence. To some extent much of our present-day thinking about globalization is imprisoned within these nineteenth-century traditions. Thus, as discussed in the previous chapter, Fukuyama considers the recent "triumph" of liberalism across the world as the beginning of a new era of "perpetual peace" (Fukuyama, 1989), while Wallerstein represents the contemporary era not as the triumph of capitalism but as an epoch of crisis which will bring in its wake emancipation on a global scale (Wallerstein, 1991). But liberalism and Marxism are increasingly inadequate guides to the complex global social architecture associated with recent phases of globalization. For globalization is transforming the basic parameters of modern social life. In doing so, it provokes the question as to how we as students (as well as subjects) of globalization should reflect on, represent and theorize the contemporary global condition. This in turn involves tracking the potential trajectories of social change brought about by globalization. In what follows, four discrete answers are provided to the question of where globalization might be leading humanity.

4.1 A global civilization

Howard Perlmutter delivers a powerful argument for viewing globalization as the harbinger of the first truly global civilization. His account of where globalization is leading is representative of a substantial and progressive body of literature which discerns in the growing intensification of global interconnectedness the emerging infrastructure of a "world society." Rather than conceiving of humanity as organized vertically into discrete nation-state units, this "world society" perspective considers humanity as a single, universal

"community of fate." As Modelski observes, today's extensive patterns of global interaction and global awareness, combined with the deepening of universal values (e.g. environmentalism, human rights, survival, etc.), point to "the reality of world society" (1972, p. 227). The complex web of transnational ties, which connects communities, households, and individuals across national boundaries, undermines the image of humanity as imprisoned within bounded national societies, and instead supports a rather different image in which humanity is pictured as being organized horizontally into multiple, overlapping, and permeable communities or systems of social interaction. This image of a world society suggests that the "... boundaries of states would be hidden from view" (Burton, 1972, p. 43). Perlmutter writes:

> By the *first global civilization* we mean a world order, with shared values, processes, and structures: (1) whereby nations and cultures become more open to influence by each other, (2) whereby there is recognition of the identities and diversities of peoples in various groups, and ethnic and religious pluralism, (3) where peoples of different ideologies and values both cooperate and compete but no ideology prevails over all the others, (4) where the global civilization becomes unique in a holistic sense while still being pluralist, and heterogeneous in its character, and (5) where increasingly these values are perceived as shared despite varying interpretations, e.g. such as we currently see for the values of openness, human rights, freedom, and democracy. ...
>
> For the first time in human history and with the help of major political and technological changes, we have the possibility of a real time, simultaneously-experienced global civilization with almost daily global events, where global cooperation is in a more horizontal than vertical mode. This is why we now see the possibility of the emergence of one single world civilization with great diversity in its constituent cultures and interdependence among poles. In fact, it would be a civilization whose distinctiveness comes from the attitudes toward and acceptance of diversity along with some shared values which act as a glue for the civilization. ...
>
> So for us, the first global civilization is a vision seen at the dawn of universal history, as Raymond Aron (1961) has put it, not the end of history as Fukuyama (1989) has recently proclaimed. From this historical perspective, there is but one human civilization which is seamless and global in its character but with a magnificent variety of indigenous variations on the life experience. This is the meaning Teilhard de Chardin (1965) gave to the planetization of humankind.
> (Perlmutter, 1991, pp. 898, 902–6)

Interestingly, Perlmutter does not equate globalization with westernization. Rather, he considers globalization to be a complex process, for he points, later in the article, to the transformation within western societies (in medicine, cuisine, lifestyles, ethnic divisions, etc.)

brought about by the widespread appropriation and global diffusion of non-western values and social practices. Indeed, he believes globalization is responsible for creating a world civilization in which there is a dynamic form of global "syncretization." He defines syncretization as ". . . the attempted reconciliation or union of different or opposing principles, practices, or parties as in philosophy or religion" (Perlmutter, 1991, p. 911). For Perlmutter, world society is a much more pluralistic and de-centered construct than our traditional "models" of the hierarchical, ordered nature of domestic (i.e. national) society. But, for most post-modernists, even domestic (national) society can no longer be conceived of as a highly integrated, highly structured social space (Bauman, 1992, p. 350). Accordingly, Perlmutter implies that, in a post-modern world of cultural fragmentation and the de-centering of power, globalization is re-articulating on a global scale the pluralism, syncretism, and diversity of contemporary domestic society. Thus, the first "global civilization" may be a post-modern one.

4.2 A capitalist world society

Neo-Marxists would consider Perlmutter's account somewhat naïve, since it fails to recognize the global power structures created by processes of globalization. With the integration of the former command economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the world-economy, the global grip of capitalism now appears firmer than ever. Thus, rather than representing the present epoch as the dawning of a "global civilization," it might be more accurate to describe it as the final consolidation of a "capitalist world society." For one factor alone has a crucial bearing on the material well-being – and thus the fate – of the bulk of the world's population: namely, the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy.

To argue, as Wallerstein does, that there is a single, capitalist world-economy is to acknowledge that the prospects of the constituent parts of that economy (the states, peoples, communities, and households) are intimately bound up with the functioning of the whole. Despite the appearance of fragmentation, the nature of global markets and the global mobility of capital ensure that few states or peoples can opt out of the logic of this capitalist world political economy. According to Harvey and Jameson, in the last thirty years capital has extended its reach and, because of new technologies of communication and control, has become ever more mobile (Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1991). Furthermore, they argue that this increasingly global form of capitalism is associated with a profound transformation in the nature of the existing world capitalist order. A new form of global capitalism ("late capitalism," "disorganized capitalism," or "transnational capitalism") has extended and deepened its reach across the globe. With this has come an increasing penetration and consolidation of capitalist social relations on a global scale. However, those excluded from or resisting this transformation have become ever more marginalized. Thus, within this world capitalist society there exist simultaneous processes of

transnational integration and national disintegration, as some communities are incorporated into the system and others organized out. So, within the same state, community, and street, there will be those whose lives are deeply implicated in and tied to this new "transnational capitalism," and many others who are either its victims or exist on its margins.

Perhaps the most visible "agent" of this new form of global capitalist order is the transnational corporation (TNC). Production, trade, and finance are now increasingly organized on a transnational basis to reap maximum economic advantage in a highly competitive world. Leslie Sklair points to the transnational organization of production and exchange as producing distinctively capitalist global social arrangements and practices. This world capitalist society is one in which the primary capitalist dynamic is located at the transnational as opposed to the national level, and in which the social relations of production are no longer imprisoned within national territorial boundaries.

Thus, to think in terms of a territorially bounded "British" economy or an "American" economy is to overlook the complex transnational networks of production, ownership, finance, and economic activity which make national territorial boundaries almost meaningless; as King notes, "Germany's largest industrial city is Sao Paulo in Brazil" (King, 1990, p. 69). Alongside these networks is also an expanding array of elite interactions. Indeed, a number of writers have suggested that these ". . . are coming together to produce a transnational capitalist class or class fraction with its own particular form of "strategic class" consciousness" (Gill and Law, 1989, p. 484).

This shift to a more complex and spatially differentiated global capitalist order has also contributed to the internationalization of the state. The "territorial non-coincidence of capital," as Murray conceives of it, has forced states to cooperate more intensively at the global level (Murray, 1971). An enormous range of functional international regimes, global and regional institutions (e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Community (EC), etc.) is required, both to manage the problems associated with this capitalist order, and to ensure its continued reproduction. The Group of Seven leading capitalist states (the G7), for instance, operates as a powerful forum for global economic coordination (Lewis, 1991). Thus, world capitalist society is subject to extensive processes of "governance" or regulation, even though no formal world government exists. These global regulatory structures are far from democratic, but rather sustain a geometry of power relations which is conducive to the needs of global capital. Because labor is primarily organized at the national level, it is therefore incredibly weak in the face of transnational capital. This is also the case for other anti-systemic movements and for poorer states. As a result, there is an imperative for greater international collaboration and coalition-building among those marginalized by this new order. Yet these are the very groups whose political and economic resources are minimal.

4.3 A bifurcated world

Rosenau locates the logic of globalization in technology – specifically the shift to a post-industrial order – and arrives at correspondingly different conclusions as to the developing form of the contemporary global system. His position shares much in common with the intellectual tradition established by Auguste Comte, one of the founding figures of modern sociology, who envisaged a world society arising from the global diffusion of techno-industrial civilization (Parkinson, 1977, p. 68). Comte's faith in the universalizing imperatives of modern industrialism has been reflected since in the work of many other writers, including Rosenau, who identifies the arrival of "post-industrialism" with yet a further transformation in the global system.

Rosenau has produced a highly original account of the contemporary global condition. He rejects not only the notion of a "global civilization" but also that of a "capitalist world society." Instead, he identifies a complete fracturing of the global system, a structural bifurcation, as the full force of post-industrialism is experienced across the globe. His argument indicates that there is no longer a single global society (or system) but rather two: a society of states, in which diplomacy and national power remain the critical variables; and a world in which multifarious organizations, groups, and individuals, each pursuing its own interests, create an ever more intricate web of transnational relations, structures, and interactions which are outside the control of any single nation-state and which constitute a kind of hyper-pluralist "transnational society."

This "multi-centric world," as Rosenau labels it, is a world of:

- *transnational organizations*, such as Greenpeace, transnational banks, the Catholic Church, the International Sociological Association, the Red Cross, Oxfam, IBM, Ford, drug cartels, international trade unions, social movements, etc.;
- *transnational problems*, such as pollution, drugs, aid, ethnicity, currency crises;
- *transnational events* or happenings, such as live TV broadcasts from Baghdad and Riyadh during the Gulf War of 1991; or the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel in the UK leading to riots in Pakistan and the withdrawal of ambassadors from Iran; or US and British foundations and political parties advising politicians in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other states on democratic process, etc.;
- *transnational communities*, based on religion (e.g. Islam, Catholicism), knowledge (e.g. academic networks), lifestyles (e.g. environmentalists), culture (e.g. the art world), or ideology (e.g. the New Right), etc.; and
- *transnational structures*, such as those of production, finance, and knowledge.

Of course, as Rosenau makes clear, these two worlds (the state-centric and the multi-centric) do interact. Thus, Greenpeace can be found

lobbying the US government, the EC, the British government, and the World Bank to make lending policies to the Third World sensitive to environmental concerns. Conversely, governments and inter-governmental agencies legislate the global or regional rules (e.g. technical standards for pharmaceuticals, or for high-definition television), within which transnational corporations and other agencies operate. However, because each of these worlds has its own norms, structures, and principles, they co-exist in an unstable and indeterminate relationship. As a consequence, global order appears to be breaking down as the world, given the dynamics of post-industrialism, undergoes a profound de-centering of power and action. Turbulence, rather than stability, is the defining characteristic of the present epoch. Accordingly, Rosenau argues, this is now the era of the bifurcated world – the age of post-international politics.

4.4 A global society of states

One of the criticisms of Rosenau's "world-view" is that by concentrating on the visible turbulence and "disorder" in the global system he completely misreads the significance of the continuities in global life. To some observers, the continued existence (if not strengthening) of the nation-state, combined with the reassertion of nationalism across the globe, and (following the collapse of communism) the formation of a host of new states, suggests that globalization has far from transformed the global situation. In other words, there is no "post-international politics," or capitalist world society, or even an emerging global civilization. Rather, the primary trajectory of global development is to be tracked in the tightening hold of the nation-states system over human affairs. The nation-state and the inter-state system, it is argued, are and will continue to remain the dominant "reality" of modern social life.

A further criticism of Rosenau's thesis (and of the other three positions elaborated in this section) concerns its ethnocentricity. It extrapolates the experience of socio-economic transformation within late capitalist societies on to the global level. Yet, as John Allen indicates in chapter 16, there is enormous controversy concerning both the nature of that transformation (post-industrial, post-Fordist, post-capitalist) and how far it is appropriate even to think in terms of socio-economic transformations.

These criticisms provide a launching pad for the claims of Robert Gilpin. For it is Gilpin's contention (which, by the way, has a great deal of support within the transnational community of international relations scholars) that globalization has not fundamentally altered the structure of the global system, nor does it require a reorientation of our thinking or theorizing with respect to the future trajectory of global socio-political development.

Gilpin's argument is a very powerful restatement of "realism" in the context of accelerated globalization. While he does not dispute that the

world may be increasingly interconnected, he is adamant that this by no means prefigures the arrival of a "world society." On the contrary, his position is that, in a global system in which there is no authority above the sovereign nation-state, there exists the constant danger of conflict and even war. This danger is compounded by the absence of any institution to enforce the peace. The result is a condition of anarchy and insecurity which pushes the political leaders of all states to maximize national power capabilities. Realists, such as Gilpin, therefore view the global states system as a system of power politics in which conflict and insecurity are the norm. In this context, the state acquires a critical role in securing and defending the interests and safety of its peoples in a dangerous world. Despite the enormous expansion in transnational and global activity, for realists it is still the case, as it was in Greek times, that only state power can secure the peaceful milieu within which such activity is able to flourish. In contrast with Rosenau's thesis of "two worlds," Gilpin argues unambiguously for the primacy of the nation-state system.

Moreover, realists would take issue with their "idealist" colleagues who conceive of globalization either as a permanent fixture of the modern age or as necessarily leading to a more interdependent world. Instead, Gilpin, as noted earlier (see section 3.1), argues vehemently that the more historically recent phases of globalization have depended on a specific configuration of global power. It is worth quoting him in full:

> As I have argued, a liberal [interdependent] international economy rests on three political foundations (Gilpin, 1981, p. 129). The first is a dominant liberal hegemonic power, or, I would also stress, liberal powers able and willing to manage and enforce the rules of a liberal commercial [capitalist] order. The second is a set of common economic, political, and security interests that help bind liberal [capitalist] states together. And the third is a shared ideological commitment to liberal values . . . Thus, since the end of the Second World War, American global hegemony, the anti-Soviet alliance, and a Keynesian welfare state ideology . . . cemented together economic relations among the three principal centres of industrial power outside the Soviet block – the United States, Japan and Western Europe.
>
> It was on the basis of this conceptualization of the relationship between international economics and politics that I and a number of other "neo-realists" were highly sceptical of the argument of the more extreme exponents of interdependence theory. Their projections into the indefinite future of an increasingly interdependent world, in which nation-states and tribal loyalties (read nationalism) would cease to exist, seemed to us to be a misreading of history . . . Such theorizing assumed the preeminence and autonomy of economic and technological forces over all others in effecting political and social change. Thus, it neglected the political base on which this interdependent world economy rests and, more importantly, the political forces that were eroding these political foundations.
> (Gilpin, 1986, pp. 311–12)

To summarize: for Gilpin, globalization has been contingent historically upon strategic and political factors, the geometry of global power relations and the ideological predispositions of the dominant states. This is a very timely argument, since the relative decline of the US, the absence of a global ideological threat to unite the most powerful capitalist states, and the resurgence everywhere of nationalist and protectionist political forces suggest the end of "the golden era" of globalization. Accordingly, for "realists," globalization does not prefigure the emergence of a "world society." On the contrary, the world is still best described (and understood) as a "society of states."

4.5 Trajectories of change

Each of the authors discussed in section 4 identifies globalization with quite different trajectories of change. Each tells a different story about where globalization is leading and what form of global society appears to be emerging. Indeed, there is little common ground between these positions, in the sense that each delivers its own distinctive response to the critical issue of the consequences of globalization for the social architecture of modernity. By their very nature, none of these positions can be judged to be either wholly right or wrong, true or false, since each is essentially attempting little more than claiming to represent the most judicious assessment of where contemporary trends are leading. Moreover, the intellectual debate on these great matters remains extremely fluid while, as Rosenau suggests, the world of experience remains highly turbulent. As the "jury" is likely to remain out for some time, the issue becomes one of which account(s) appears to be more or less convincing.

Although these four perspectives offer quite different visions of the global predicament, they do share some common ground. In particular, while each posits a quite different kind of global social architecture arising from globalization, they all share a belief that modern societies can only be understood within a global setting. Additionally, each raises the question of whether the nation-state is any longer the most appropriate political unit for organizing human affairs in a more interconnected world system. Even Gilpin, a staunch champion of realism, acknowledges that the intensification of economic interdependence "... has decreased national economic autonomy," and that it is unclear what the implications of "... contemporary military and economic developments will be on the scale of political organization" (Gilpin, 1981, p. 229). As the end of the century draws near, globalization is forcing us to rethink the nature of the "political community," the basic unit of human affairs. Indeed, globalization appears to be challenging the modern orthodoxy that the nation-state defines the "good community" (Modelski, 1972, p. 56).

5 Globalization and the Future Political Community

Writing in 1957, John Hertz predicted the "demise" of the territorial state as the primary political unit in world affairs (Hertz, 1957). His prediction derived from the argument that nuclear weapons made it impossible for states to defend their citizens against attack. Once states could no longer fulfill this essential duty they became, Hertz suggested, obsolete. Slightly in excess of three decades later, Jameson, commenting on the ". . . prodigious expansion of capitalism in its third (or multinational) stage" (1991, p. 319), observed that ". . . not merely the older city but even the nation-state itself has ceased to play a central functional and formal role in a process that has in a new quantum leap of capital prodigiously expanded beyond them, leaving them behind as ruined and archaic remains of earlier stages in the development of this mode of production" (1991, p. 412). However, to talk the now-fashionable language of the "end of the nation-state" may be to invite the twin dangers of completely misreading its contemporary predicament while simultaneously neglecting the real underlying challenges to the nature of the "modern political community" inscribed within the processes of globalization.

5.1 Dissolving the nation-state

Globalization has been, and continues to be, associated with a "crisis of the territorial nation-state." Daniel Bell, writing about the US position in the future global order, captured this sentiment memorably in his comment that the nation-state was ". . . too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life" (Bell, 1987, p. 14). While the unevenness of globalization and the diversity of modern state forms mean that any generalization on this issue demands careful qualification, nevertheless, with respect to the late (or advanced) capitalist states, there is a powerful argument which indicates that globalization is dissolving the essential structures of modern statehood. In effect, globalization is understood to be compromising four critical aspects of the modern nation-state: its competence; its form; its autonomy; and, ultimately, its authority or legitimacy.

In a global economic system in which productive capital, finance, and trade flow across national boundaries, the traditional distinction between the internal and external domains no longer holds. Such interconnectedness creates a situation in which decisions in one state can produce major consequences for the citizens of many other states. A recession in the United States, for instance, takes its toll in the factories of Europe, Japan, Latin America, and Asia. States therefore face extensive pressures from their citizens and domestic groups to regulate those transnational activities which directly impinge on their interests and livelihoods. Such pressures, as in the environmental or economic issue-areas, generate a significant political momentum for the expansion of international regimes and international regulatory

frameworks at the regional or global levels. Accordingly, as Morse argues, in conditions of systemic "interdependence," the inability of governments to fulfill the demands of their citizens without international cooperation is evidence of the declining competence of states (Morse, 1976). While this may be particularly acute in the economic domain, a dwindling number of policy problems can now be resolved through purely domestic actions or decisions (e.g. drugs, environment, national security, immigration, etc.). Moreover, the corollary is also the case, since the resolution of international problems increasingly demands domestic action. Throughout the 1980s, for example, western governments, in response to the greater mobility of capital, were forced into extensive international coordination of ". . . monetary and fiscal policies – policies that had traditionally been considered 'internal'" (Webb, 1991, p. 311). Morse argues that "interdependence" has eroded the traditional boundaries between the internal and external domains, so encouraging an expansion in the functions and responsibilities of the state while simultaneously denying it effective national control over policy formulation and policy outcomes (Morse, 1976). This condition has been referred to as the "widening and weakening" of the state, or, as Rosenau prefers to label it, "the widening and withering" of the state's competence.

Strongly associated with this declining competence is an erosion of the capacity of the state to enforce its demands on others as the traditional instruments of policy are undermined by accelerating globalization. Whereas military force has been fundamental to state power, it is now of limited utility in achieving all but the most restricted of national goals (Jervis, 1991). Military force remains a last resort, and is largely irrelevant to the resolution of some of the key problems confronting modern states, such as economic welfare, environmental problems, trade matters, etc. According to Rosecrance, economic power and economic diplomacy are central to state security in the contemporary age because economic capabilities are extremely "fungible" (i.e. transferable into direct influence or power) (Rosecrance, 1986). In effect, the suggestion is that the currency of power in the global system has been transformed from military to economic capabilities (Nye, 1989). In the post-Cold War era of rapid demilitarization, this shift in the primary currency of power has doubly compounded the problems for states in trying to protect and secure their interests in a highly complex and dynamically interconnected world order (Shaw, 1991). The result is a significant shift towards multilateral diplomacy and collective action, which in the process further erodes the competence of states to control their own destiny.

It is not only the competence of states which is diminished by globalizing pressures; the form of the state is also subtly altered. With the increased emphasis upon international coordination and cooperation has come a staggering expansion in the numbers of inter-governmental organizations and international regimes. Thus, in whatever sector of state policy one cares to name, there exists a corresponding set of international regulatory institutions or agencies. For instance, there exists an international monetary regime which

embraces inter-governmental organizations (e.g. the IMF) together with a set of international norms, rules, principles, regulations, and decision-making arenas, supplemented by informal policy coordination networks between the finance ministries of the major western states (the G7), as well as between central banks, and the major private transnational banks. In the post-war era, there has been an explosive growth in the number and significance of international regimes and organizations. Cox refers to this as the "internationalization" of the state (Cox, 1987). While not juridically above the state, most western governments are so deeply enmeshed in these regulatory and decision-making structures that national and international policy formulations have become inseparable. Moreover, some international organizations and regimes have acquired quasi-supranational powers. The European Community is a primary example, in that decisions (in some domains) taken by a majority can be legally imposed on other member governments, thus compromising their juridical sovereignty.

In effect, the "internationalization" of the state has created forms of international governance in which collective policy making and coordination of policy between governments have become vital to the achievement of national and international goals. Without knowing it, many aspects of people's daily existence are now shaped by the regulatory activities of a host of international regimes. This process of the "internationalization" of the state has fundamental implications for the coherence of the state apparatus and, ultimately, challenges democratic practices. Domestic bureaucracies become internationalized with the result that ministers and cabinets find it difficult to maintain direct control over policy formulation. Within international agencies, transgovernmental coalitions of bureaucrats develop with the result that policy outcomes are no longer decided by elected politicians or by the organs of central government (Keohane and Nye, 1977). This kind of multi-bureaucratic decision making, as Kaiser calls it, dissolves the notion of the state as a monolithic creature pursuing a coherent national interest (Kaiser, 1972). Instead, the state appears on the international stage as a fragmented coalition of bureaucratic agencies each pursuing its own agenda with minimal central direction or control.

If the institutional form of the state is recast by the processes of globalization, its effects are also experienced at a deeper structural level. Recent studies have begun to explore the relationship between globalization and the effectiveness of state strategies for managing the domestic socio-economic domain. What emerges from many of these studies is an awareness of how greater interconnectedness between states imposes intense pressures for a convergence in state socio-economic strategies. Gourevitch argues that the global economic and competitive pressures on states in the 1980s forced them "... to curtail state spending and interventions. Whatever the differences in partisan outcomes, all governments have been pressed in the same direction" (Gourevitch, 1986, p. 33). As a result, most governments have discarded strategies of full employment and interventionism because they might reduce their competitive edge in global markets. In a highly competitive

but interconnected global economy, state strategies and the domestic socio-political coalitions which underpin them are increasingly sensitive to world economic conditions. According to Garrett and Lange, "The new international economic environment has undercut the effectiveness of the partisan strategies of the left and right based respectively on broadly 'Keynesian' and 'monetarist' fiscal and monetary policies" (Garrett and Lange, 1991, p. 541).

The discussion so far points to a third aspect of the consequences of globalization: the diminution of state autonomy. Clearly, states have always operated under constraints of all kinds; none has ever been free to act completely independently from external pressures. However, it is frequently argued that globalization has imposed tighter limits on the exercise of state autonomy across a range of policy domains (McGrew, 1992). State autonomy can be defined in terms of a state's capacity to act independently, within circumscribed parameters, in the articulation and pursuit of domestic and international policy objectives. State autonomy can be further differentiated with respect to both its "scope" and the "domains" within which it can be exercised. By "scope" is meant the level or intensity of constraints on state action, while "domains" refers to the policy spaces or issue-areas within which such constraints operate (McGrew, 1992). This conceptual definition allows an important distinction to be made between sovereignty – the *de jure* use of power through supreme legal authority or competence within a defined territory – and autonomy. It also suggests that the notion of a loss of state autonomy has to be specified and qualified quite carefully.

As implied already, one of the structural consequences of globalization is to deny the relevance or practicality of autarky – strategies of self-reliance. Thus, states operate within a set of prefigured strategic and policy options which immediately restrict the menu of policies from which state managers can choose. This is particularly evident in the economic and financial policy domains. The scale of financial transactions is such that no single state by itself can effectively control the system in which it is enmeshed. Frieden observes that, "In April 1989, foreign exchange trading in the world's financial centres averaged about $650 billion a day, equivalent to nearly $500 million a minute and to forty times the amount of world trade a day" (Frieden, 1991, p. 428). This, as Webb indicates, was twice the amount of the total foreign reserve holdings of the US, Japanese, and UK central banks combined for the entire month (Webb, 1991, p. 320). A very convincing argument can thus be made that the "... implications of interdependence ... are clear: governments no longer possess the autonomy to pursue independent macroeconomic strategies effectively, even if they were to seek to do so" (Garrett and Lange, 1991, p. 543). This is simply because it is exceedingly difficult to "buck" the global markets, for "... differences in the macroeconomic policies pursued by various countries immediately trigger large flows of capital" (Webb, 1991, p. 318). However, while shifts in state socio-economic strategies are severely constrained, this does not mean that governments are completely immobilized.

While state autonomy appears most compromised in the economic

and financial domains, similar intense constraints operate in other areas too. Global warming compromises state autonomy, as does the parcelling out and regulation of the world airwaves, without which effective global communications would be impossible (Starke, 1990; Vogler, 1992). While acknowledging the constraints on state autonomy, it is nevertheless important to recognize that effective diminution of state autonomy varies considerably between different kinds of nation-state, as well as across time and in different policy sectors. Thus, advanced capitalist states may have greater autonomy in the global system than peripheral states, while the US has greater autonomy in some domains (e.g. military) than in others (e.g. financial). Propositions suggesting the general erosion of state autonomy in the face of increasing globalization therefore demand considerable qualification.

Finally, the combined consequences of eroding competence, converging forms, and diminishing autonomy have contributed to an erosion of state authority and legitimacy. Influenced by "crisis of governability" theories of the 1970s, a number of writers have argued that globalization is contributing to a crisis of compliance and authority within the nation-state (Rosenau, 1990; Burton, 1972). This view is driven by a conception of authority and legitimacy located in a discourse of performance and effectiveness. Very succinctly, the thesis is that, because globalization undermines the competence and autonomy of the nation-state, it reduces the effectiveness of government which, in turn, undermines the legitimacy and authority of the state (Rosenau, 1990). Moreover, in a world of global communications, where citizens can readily observe the global context of "domestic" problems and the parochial nature of domestic political debate, further strains are placed on compliance and authority relationships. Governments too contribute enormously to the sense of immobilization and despair which this situation generates by constantly stressing the international constraints on state action. In consequence, the dwindling efficacy of the state and its bases of authority is underlined.

In addition, the existence of global regimes and international organizations poses a further challenge to the actual authority of the state. Global and regional institutions, such as the IMF and the EC, may directly challenge the sovereignty and authority of member states when they impose decisions and policies upon them. National authorities, in some circumstances, may appear as little more than the "local" machinery for implementing regional or international policies. In a system in which international regimes and forms of international regulatory activity are expanding rapidly, the "threat from above" to the authority of the nation-state is arguably a real one.

But globalization also enhances the "threats from below." What Rosenau refers to as the proliferation of "sub-groupism," and others the fragmentation of civil society, is fuelled by globalizing imperatives (Rosenau, 1990, p. 40). As section 3.2 discussed, transnational integration and national disintegration of communities, the rise of ethnicity, the resurgence of nationalism, and the surfacing of new loyalties (e.g. environmentalism) are all associated with the dynamics of accelerating globalization. Globalization stimulates a search for new

identities, so challenging the traditional "integrating" ideologies which have defined the boundaries of the "national" political community. As Rosenau observes, because of the diverse ethnic make-up of most states, the label ". . . nation-state fits only a quarter of the members of the global states system" (Rosenau, 1990, p. 406). This suggests that the divisive consequences of globalization operate on an enormously fertile terrain. Globalization is therefore considered by a number of writers to be undermining compliance and contributing to the erosion of state authority "from below."

A powerful argument can be made that globalization is compromising the authority, the autonomy, the nature, and the competence of the modern nation-state. While generalizing is fraught with dangers, there is a significant community of scholars within the social sciences who would agree with Freeman that ". . . the nation-state has become at best immobilized and at worst obsolete" (quoted in Frieden, 1991, p. 427). However, countervailing tendencies do exist.

5.2 Rejuvenating the nation-state

Convincing though the "declinist" argument appears, it is also crucial to acknowledge the significance of powerful countervailing forces which may be strengthening the nation-state. Here we will examine briefly the four main countervailing forces which are identified in the literature: the state's monopoly of military power; the potency of nationalism; the empowerment of states through international cooperation; and finally the "myth" of interdependence.

As Gilpin claimed, the primary focus in the global states system remains the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace. States, through their monopoly over the means of violence, and their attention to the balance of power, are therefore critical agents in maintaining global order. While military power may appear of less utility in the modern context, this, as Waltz argues, is a tribute to its vital role in sustaining the peace: "Possession of power should not be identified with the use of force, and the usefulness of force should not be confused with its usability . . . Power maintains an order; the use of force signals its breakdown" (Waltz, 1979, p. 185). Thus, the fact that military force is used infrequently to sustain the global order is not an indictment of the declining relevance of military power (and by implication the nation-state), but, on the contrary, can be seen as evidence of its centrality to the contemporary global order. Thus, for Bull, the state retains a "positive role" in the modern world primarily because its monopoly of military power provides its citizens with relative security in a highly dangerous world (Bull, 1979).

Alongside security, the state also provides a focus for personal and communal identity. As Modelski comments, the "nationalization" of the global system is a fairly recent phenomenon and it is, as daily events indicate, a largely unfinished project. Nationalism along with the newly resurgent forms of ethnic nationalism are extremely powerful evidence that, even if the state is functionally redundant, culturally and psychologically it remains of critical significance in structuring the

political and social organization of humankind. As Hanreider notes: "Nationalism . . . is alive and well. Far from being secondary or obsolete, the nation-state, nationalism, and the idea of the national interest are central elements in contemporary world politics" (Hanreider, 1978, p. 1277).

While pursuing their national interest through cooperation and collaboration, states also empower themselves. As Keohane and Gilpin argue, the creation of international regimes and institutions of cooperation does not in any sense weaken the nation-state (Keohane, 1984; Gilpin, 1987a). On the contrary, in many cases, international cooperation, as opposed to unilateral action, allows states simultaneously to pursue their national interests and to achieve more effective control over their national destiny. Within the context of a global economy, international coordination of exchange rates (for instance, the European Exchange Rate Mechanism) can enhance state autonomy rather than diminish it because it affords, through collective action, greater security and benefits than any corresponding attempts at unilateral action. To suggest that globalization necessarily undermines state autonomy is therefore to ignore the ways in which states empower themselves against the vagaries of global forces through collective action. According to Gordon:

> . . . the role of the state has grown substantially since the early 1970s; state policies have become increasingly decisive on the international front, not more futile . . . And small consolation though it may be . . . everyone including transnational corporations has become increasingly dependent upon coordinated state intervention for restructuring and resolution of the underlying dynamics of the [economic] crisis.
> (Gordon, 1988, p. 63)

Finally, a number of writers question whether globalization is really creating a more "interdependent" world or convergence among state policies. Care must be taken here to distinguish between the concepts of interconnectedness and interdependence; interdependence should not be elided with notions of interconnectedness (or globalization). Interdependence implies a condition of *mutual* vulnerability to external events, whereas dependence implies a condition of *asymmetrical* vulnerability. While processes of globalization may generate interdependencies between national communities, equally they can generate relationships of dependence and reinforce existing inequalities in the world system. Moreover, globalization often involves little more than interconnectedness, which implies a *sensitivity*, as opposed to a *vulnerability*, to external events or actions. Accordingly, globalization embraces both interconnectedness and interdependence, but these are radically different outcomes of the same process. Definitions aside, what is significant is the emphasis given in the "declinist" argument to the evidence of an increasingly *interdependent* world in which state strategies and policies are converging. Yet both Krasner and Gordon, coming from radically opposing analytical positions, conclude that, although it may be more *interconnected*, the world is less

interdependent today than it was before World War I (Krasner, 1991; Gordon, 1988). Similarly, Scharpf argues convincingly that states do matter by demonstrating that, despite global constraints, state strategies of socio-economic management in the 1980s have not converged as much as the "declinist" view suggests (Scharpf, 1991).

It follows from these points that the "declinist" vision of the "end of the nation-state" seems somewhat premature. Yet there are contradictory processes at work, so that it would seem equally untenable to suggest either that the state has been left unscathed by globalization or that it has been strengthened. None of these conclusions seems entirely convincing, recognizing the dialectics of globalization and the adaptive capacities of the modern nation-state. Cerny discerns in this growing intersection of global and domestic forces the beginnings of the "changing architecture of the modern state" (Cerny, 1990). Globalization, in other words, requires us to accept the uncomfortable conclusion that the modern nation-state is ". . . both indispensable and inadequate" (Deutsch, 1988, p. 54). But it also invites us to rethink our understanding of the modern political community.

5.3 Rethinking sovereignty and political community

Sovereignty is concerned with the location of ultimate power within a territorially bounded political community. Indeed, sovereignty defines the "good community" by manufacturing the political space which separates the "community" from the "others." In the modern era the "good community" has come to be associated with the "national community," although this was not always the case. But today globalization may be tearing away the notion of sovereignty from its rootedness in the national community and the territorially bounded state (Beitz, 1991). As Held observes:

> The modern theory of the sovereign democratic state presupposes the idea of a "national community of fate" – a community which rightly governs itself and determines its own future. This idea is challenged fundamentally by the nature and pattern of global interconnections . . . National communities by no means exclusively "programme" the actions, decisions and policies of their governments and the latter by no means simply determine what is right or appropriate for their citizens alone.
> (Held, 1991, p. 202)

Rather than the decline or the transcendence of the modern nation-state, globalization may be bringing about a ". . . re-articulation of international political space" (Ruggie, 1991, p. 37), introducing a much more complex architecture of sovereign political power than presently exists. Sovereignty, along with the notion of political community, has become imbued, in Bauman's language, with incredible ambiguity (Bauman, 1992). In his explanation of the consequences of globalization for national sovereignty, Held concludes that globalization reveals:

> . . . a set of forces which combine to restrict the freedom of action of governments and states by blurring the boundaries of domestic politics, transforming the conditions of political decision making, changing the institutional and organizational context of national polities, altering the legal framework and administrative practices of governments and obscuring the lines of responsibility and accountability of national states themselves. These processes alone warrant the statement that the operation of states in an ever more complex international system both limits their autonomy and impinges increasingly upon their sovereignty. Any conception of sovereignty which interprets it as an illimitable and indivisible form of public power is undermined. Sovereignty itself has to be conceived today as already divided among a number of agencies, national, regional and international, and limited by the very nature of this plurality.
> (Held, 1991, p. 222)

This model of overlapping and pluralistic authority structures has much in common with medieval political practice and organization (Cook and Hertzman, 1983, ch. 8). Bull, for instance, refers to a "new medievalism":

> If modern states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authorities, and on the other with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-mediaeval form of universal political order might be said to have emerged.
> (Bull, 1977, pp. 254–5)

A global political forum: the United Nations takes on a vital role in the "new world order" following the end of the Cold War. George P. Windham, AP.

This "new medievalism" suggests a reconstitution of political community, such that it is no longer identified solely with the territorial nation-state but is conceived in more pluralistic terms. Thus, as in medieval times, we are forced to think in terms of overlapping global, regional, transnational, national, and local political communities. It is in this sense that globalization can be said to be dissolving, rather than contributing to, the transcendence of the sovereign nation-state and the bounded national political community. Sovereignty, and with it the nature of the "political community," is being reconstituted by the forces of globalization.

6 Globalization and a Universal Sociology

If globalization invites us to rethink our notions of the sovereign nation-state and political community, then it certainly demands a reconsideration of the foundational concept in modern sociological thought: the concept of "society." Bauman defines the problem in transparent terms:

> It seems that most sociologists of the era of modern orthodoxy believed that – all being said – the nation state is close enough to its own postulate of sovereignty to validate the use of its theoretical expression – the "society" concept – as an adequate framework for sociological analysis . . . In the postmodern world, this belief carries less conviction than ever before.
> (Bauman, 1992, p. 57)

There is little need to rehearse again the arguments which make Bauman's proposition so convincing, since they have been discussed in previous sections. Instead, the objective here is to think through the implications of the "globalist turn" for the contemporary sociological enterprise. For it should be evident that, if the "society" – the ordered, bounded totality – of modern sociology turns out to be a porous, fragmented, and permeable social space, then a new "subject," or primary unit of analysis, is required. In some respects the recent writings of Mann, Giddens, Robertson, and Bauman can be seen as attempts to refocus the discipline around a conception of the social which acknowledges the significance of the "globalist turn" and thereby distances itself from the orthodox approach in which "society" is the central focus (Mann, 1986; Giddens, 1990, 1991; Robertson, 1990; Robertson and Lechner, 1985; Bauman, 1992). Mann, for instance, states: "I would abolish the concept of 'society' altogether" (Mann, 1986, p. 2). Instead, he conceives of societies not as unitary social systems or bounded totalities but as constituted by ". . . multiple

overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power" (p. 1). Giddens too stresses that "The undue reliance which sociologists have placed upon the idea of 'society', where this means a bounded system, should be replaced by a starting point that concentrates upon analysing how social life is ordered across time and space – the problem of time–space distanciation" (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). Globalization thus dislodges "society" from its focal position in the discourse of modern sociology. But what is to replace it?

Post-modernists might appear initially to have the answer, because of their attachment to diversity, difference, and the plurality of communities and identities which define the post-modern condition. Proponents of post-modernism on the whole argue that the notion of "society" is a totalizing concept which is completely redundant in the contemporary era. This is because post-modernism is associated with "... a view of the human world as irreducibly and irrevocably pluralistic, split into a multitude of sovereign units and sites of authority, with no horizontal or vertical order, either in actuality or potency" (Bauman, 1992, p. 35). Understanding this world, for many post-modernist theorists, requires accepting its essentially incoherent character and avoiding the temptation to impose order on it through totalizing and universal theoretical discourses. As Jameson notes, post-modernism prosecutes a "war on totality" (Jameson, 1991, p. 400). It denies the possibility of universal reasoning and accounts of the social life which claim universal validity. Paradoxically, for post-modernists, the existence of a "postmodern global space" (Jameson, 1991, p. 363) is not considered problematic, despite the implication that it assumes the operation of universal processes which are actively unifying humankind. Thus, Robertson refers to "the universalization of particularism" and the "particularization of universalism" (Robertson, 1991a). Yet this seems a logical contradiction. It might therefore be argued that post-modernism too, alongside the orthodox conception of society, is a victim of globalization. Indeed, in significant respects post-modernism, like much conventional sociological thinking, fails to confront the profound implications for its own conceptual categories and theoretical discourse which flow from globalization. Rather than looking to post-modernism to redress our uncertainty about the primary focus of the contemporary sociological enterprise, Archer suggests the solution is to be found elsewhere in a "sociology for one world" – a re-visioning of the Enlightenment project (Archer, 1991).

The Enlightenment project was based on a belief in the universality of reason and the universal character of scientific explanation. A science of society was thus by definition a universal enterprise. However, as chapter 19 will indicate, few social scientists today would accept that it is possible to construct wholly objective or universal accounts of social phenomena. Within modern sociology (whose intellectual foundations are rooted in the Enlightenment project's commitment to rational inquiry and human emancipation), post-modernism and the critique of a positive science of social affairs have prosecuted a "war on universalism." Yet the intensity of globalization in the current epoch produces a startling irony: just as the world is

being compressed into one "place," sociology is becoming increasingly localized and relativized (Archer, 1991).

In a stinging critique of the "post-modernizing" and "relativizing" of sociology, Archer delivers a convincing case that globalization "... supplies us with good reasons for overhauling our theoretical assumptions and frameworks" (Archer, 1991, p. 133). This involves accepting that "... the globalization of society means that societies are no longer the prime units of sociology" (p. 133). What is to replace this focus on societies is a "sociology of One World" which recognizes that "global processes are now partly constitutive of social reality everywhere" (p. 134).

In cultivating this position, Archer is delivering a radical challenge to both orthodox and post-modernist sociological thinking. For, put simply, she is arguing that globalization demands a critical rethinking of the sociological enterprise to reflect the arrival of "One World." Such rethinking, she proposes, has to be fired by a commitment to both reason and humanity, and so requires a re-centering of reasoning and the human being within the sociological enterprise. In some respects she invites a reconstitution of the Enlightenment project, but shorn of its pretensions to be a positive science of social affairs and its de-humanizing of the human subject. For Archer, "... reasoning and humanity constitutes the bridge to international sociology" and so to delivering a "sociology for one world" (Archer, 1991, p. 144).

This chapter began with the claim that globalization invites a reconceptualization of the social architecture of modernity. In exploring this claim it has examined the dimensions of globalization, competing visions of today's global society, and the implications of globalization for the future of the nation-state and political community. What has emerged from this discussion is the urgent need for a re-visioning of the sociological project to confront the existence of a late twentieth-century "global social formation." As Archer concludes, this sociology for one world must aim "... at no less than the mobilization of Humanity itself as one self-conscious social agent. What ecologists have done for the protection of the natural world, only the sociologist can attempt for the most dangerous and endangered species ... For commitment to Humanity is also an affirmation that it is ultimately one and indivisible" (Archer, 1991, p. 146).

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